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Strengthening the Efficacy of Acquisitive
Prescription in International Law:
Implications for the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands
Dispute
Richard Stubbs1
Nestled between Taiwan, Mainland China, and Japan in the East
China Sea lie five uninhabited islands and three barren rocks known
as the Senkaku Islands.2 The Senkakus were mostly ignored in the
records of international discourse until 1969 when potentially vast
oil and gas reserves were discovered in their vicinity.3 Since then,
the ownership of the islands has been hotly contested between China
and Japan.4 To date, it has become one of the primary topics of contention between the two Asian powers.
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The situation has recently threatened to erupt into violence.5 Prior
to August 2012 the islands were privately owned by a Japanese family. Then, the Japanese government purchased the islands provoking
violent protests across China.6 The following month, seventy-five
Taiwanese fishing boats escorted by ten Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels entered the immediate vicinity of the islands and were intercepted by Japanese Coast Guard ships. The two parties announced their
respective claims on the islands using LED lights and loud speakers
and blasted each other with water cannons.7 In the months following,
a Chinese government aircraft entered the islands’ airspace, prompting Japan to scramble fighter jets in response.8 Japan also claims
that in January 2013, a Chinese frigate locked its weapons targeting
systems on a Japanese destroyer.9 Over the last several years, there
has been a consistent increase of military displays in the vicinity of
the islands, causing observers to label it a “powder keg.”10
Considering how close to catastrophe this dispute has come, it
is in the best interests of the international community to help find a
resolution to this territorial dispute. The Senkaku Islands controversy is the result of centuries of shifting legal norms, regional political
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tension, and outright warfare between China and Japan.11 Addressing all of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, and beyond
the scope of the law itself, but there is one malfunctioning common
law principle called “acquisitive prescription” that encourages this
brinkmanship. I aim to help defuse the situation by proposing new
standards for acquisitive prescription. Establishing clear standards
will reduce the incentive to assert a territorial claim with military
force.
To lay the foundation of these standards, Section I will review
the historical context of the dispute, while Section II will review the
legal precedent for acquisitive prescription. Section III will outline
the new standards based on the preceding sections, and Section IV
will apply them to the Senkaku Islands dispute.

I. Dispute Background
Before 1895, the islands were little more than a geographic footnote. By 1403 AD, the Chinese had discovered and named the islands.
During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the islands were navigational
markers on the way to the kingdom of Ryukyu, and a popular spot
for Chinese fishermen. Furthermore, both the Ming and Qing dynasties included it in coastal defense maps.12 Nevertheless, Japan claims
that over several decades in the late 1800s its government surveyed
the area and found no evidence of habitation or exercise of authority by the Ming or Qing dynasties. They then declared the islands
terra nullius - uninhabited land - and made the decision to annex
the islands into Okinawa Prefecture in January 1895 during the First
Sino-Japanese War. Several months later, the war ended with the
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, where Taiwan and its islands
were ceded to Japan.
On the other hand, the Chinese believe the Japanese seized the
island as the spoils of victory, as part of “[t]he island of Formosa,
11

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 27.

12

Diaoyudao shi Zhongguo de Guyou Lingtu (钓鱼岛是中国的固有领
土) [Diaoyu Islands are the Inherent Territory of China] (Sept. 25, 2009)
http://news.qq.com/a/20120925/001641.htm.
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together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island
of Formosa.”13 In 1945, in accordance with the 1943 Declaration of
Cairo, the Japanese relinquished to their original owners control of
any territories taken through war to their original owners.14 Therefore, China claims that the Japanese should have handed over the
Senkakus along with Taiwan and its other islands in 1945.15 The
Japanese, on the other hand, argue that the annexation of the Senkakus and the cession of Taiwan and its other islands were two separate acts. While the latter was an act of war, the former was not.16
Therefore, the Senkaku Islands were not among the territories that
the Cairo Declaration forced Japan to return. The controversy surrounding the territory thus traces right back to painful memories of
war-time atrocities and national humiliation for both sides.
However, none of this surfaced for decades after the fact. After
the end of World War II, the Senkakus were administered by the
United States of America, along with the rest of Okinawa Prefecture.17 Then, in 1969, the United Nations Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East discovered potentially vast oil and gas reserves
near the islands. By this time the U.S. had already returned authority of the rest of Okinawa back to Japan, but the administration of
the Senkakus was not transferred until 1972. The U.S. was clear that
this was a transfer of administrative duties, not of sovereignty. It was
at this time that China increasingly began to criticize the situation.

II. Acquisitive Prescription
The status of the islands prior to 1895 may be a moot point.
The Japanese argue that even if the initial annexation wasn’t legal,
ownership of the Senkakus was passed to them through acquisitive
13

Treaties Between China and Foreign States 590 art. 2(b) (2nd ed. by
order of the Inspector Gen. of Customs 1917).

14

The Cairo Conference, 1943 (Jan. 20, 2001) http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/
pa/ho/time/wwii/107184.htm.
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Diaoyudao shi Zhongguo de Guyou Lingtu, supra note 12.
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Moteki, supra note 4, at 7.

17

Id. at 9–14.
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prescription.18 This is a common law principle where an unclear or
faulty initial claim to property is made legitimate after lengthy, unopposed possession. In the words of D.H.N. Johnson, “Display of
authority by the one party, acquiescence in that display by the other
party—those are the sine qua non of acquisitive prescription.”19
Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky argues that it is the fear of appearing
to acquiesce—and thus losing the claim—that motivates the military tit for tat currently playing out.20 The problem is exacerbated
by the fact that the requirements of acquisitive prescription are open
to interpretation.21 If the international community clarifies these requirements, it can assure both nations that their claims need not be
enforced militarily, which is the first step towards a peaceful resolution. Roman law, international arbitrations, and decisions of the
International Court of Justice provide insight into what a more efficacious standard might look like.
(i) Roman Law
The roots of prescription as a common law principle go back to
Roman law. In Roman law, usucapio was a principle wherein the
possessor of a property whose original title to that property was defective could nevertheless acquire the title so long as he had 1) acquired the property in good faith, 2) possessed it physically (corpus
occupandi) and with the intent of ownership (animus occupandi),
and 3) possessed it without interruption for a period of time defined
by law.22
The analogous principle in international law is acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription, though, does not require the
18

Id. at 17.

19

D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 Brit.
Y.B. Int’l L. 332, 345, (1950).

20

Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 3, at 906.

21

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 106 (“Basing a claim merely on prescription
might not be advisable as this legal device is quite elastic and unpredictable.”).

22

Johnson, supra note 19, at 334–335.
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original acquisition to be in good faith. Instead, it requires the acquiescence of the defendant state. Additionally, acquisitive prescription does not define a minimum length of possession. These two
differences—the lack of a good faith clause and the lack of any strict
temporal requirement—make acquisitive prescription a far more
contentious rule than its Roman ancestor.23
(ii) Modern Precedent
Before I begin addressing these issues I will review both the
motivations for and modes of implementation of acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription differs from occupation (the acquisition of virgin territory, or terra nullius) only in that the latter
deals with previously unclaimed territory, while the former deals
with territory that has at some point been claimed already.24 Consequently, I will look at several cases where, though prescription is
not at issue, the status of an occupation is. Besides the difference in
territorial status, there is also the issue of acquiescence, the one legal
element unique to this mode of territorial acquisition. Acquisitive
prescription has been claimed or cited in a number of international
arbitrations or decisions by international courts, providing a variety
of views on what exactly constitutes acquisitive prescription. The
following cases examine acquisitive prescription in a variety of situations and form the bedrock of acquisitive prescription precedent in
international law.
Venezuela vs. Great Britain, 1895
In 1895, Venezuela disputed with Great Britain over rights to
the Guayana Esequiba region. Venezuela believed they inherited the
territory from the Spanish Empire. Great Britain argued that before
Venezuela’s independence, Spain did not have effective possession
of the disputed territory and that the native population had an alli-

23

Id. at 337.

24

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 105.
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ance with the Dutch in 1814, which influence passed to the British.25
The Tribunal of Arbitration awarded Great Britain 90% of the territory. The arbitrators proposed a requirement of 50 years for prescription to take effect.26
United States vs. Mexico, 1911 (1963)
The border between the United States and Mexico had originally
been defined as the midpoint of the Rio Grande River. However, over
the following decades the river shifted to the south, technically converting some Mexican territory into U.S. Territory. Mexico claimed
the border should have remained north of the river’s then current
position.27 The U.S. maintained that Mexico had acquiesced to its
control of the territory. The tribunal ruled that prescription requires
peaceful unchallenged exercise of authority and the U.S administration failed to effectively establish that standard: the Mexican government consistently protested and one American official threatened a
Mexican official who tried to exert authority over the region.
Netherlands vs. USA, 1928
The USA and the Netherlands disputed the territorial rights over
the Island of Palmas. Through the Treaty of Paris in 1898, Spain
ceded the Philippines to the United States, but the Netherlands also
claimed sovereignty over one island, the Island of Palmas. The two
countries took the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The
arbitrator found that title by discovery is only an inchoate title - it requires further exercise of State authority to be confirmed.28 Second,
he concluded that if another sovereign begins to exercise continuous and actual sovereignty, and the discoverer does not contest this
25

Cedric L. Joseph, The Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Arbitration of 1899:
An Appraisal: Part 1, 10.2 Caribbean Stud., 56, 64–67 (1970).

26

Id. at 88.

27

Chamizal (Mex. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 318 (Int’l Boundary Comm’n
1911).

28

Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845–46 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
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claim, the claim by the sovereign that exercises authority is greater
than a title based on mere discovery.29
Norway vs. Denmark, 1933
In 1933, Norway tried to claim land in Eastern Greenland already claimed by Denmark. Denmark had allowed Norway to establish hunting settlements, but Norway argued that the territory was
terra nullius. Denmark had previously claimed the whole of Greenland even though they had never settled the eastern portion. The
Permanent Court of International Justice rejected Norway’s claim
because Norway’s settlement was part of an agreement between the
two countries and therefore was not an occupation.30
France vs. England, 1953
The Minquiers and Ecrehos islands in the English Channel were
officially given to France in 1360, but the UK had been exercising
various administrative rights over the islands. Based on this, the ICJ
awarded England the title despite France’s stronger historical claim.31

Cambodia vs. Thailand, 1961
In 1907, the French colonial authorities drew the map of the border between French-owned Cambodia and Thailand (then Siam).
In their map, the Temple of Preah Vihear was within Cambodian
territory. This map was presented to the Siamese government, who
accepted it. The case, brought to the Court over 50 years later, was
decided in Cambodia’s favor specifically because Thailand failed
to protest the map in a reasonable amount of time. The court determined that Thailand had already acquiesced to the border in the
1907 map by the time the case was brought up.32
29

Id. at 867–68.

30

Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53 (Apr. 5).

31

D. H. N. Johnson, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 3.2 Int’l & Comp.
L.Q. 189–216 (1954).

32

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15).
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Botswana v. Namibia, 1999
In 1999 the ICJ heard arguments from Namibia and Botswana
regarding the island known respectively as Kasikili or Sedudu. Namibia claimed that the otherwise uninhabited island was frequented
by the Masubia tribe of natives, and that their presence generated
a claim in Namibia’s behalf. The Court, however, ruled that since
the Masubia tribe was only ever present intermittently, it did not
represent a continuous presence, which they said was necessary to
generate a claim through prescription.33
Indonesia v. Malaysia, 2002
The most recent case is the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, heard by the ICJ in 2002.
Indonesia claimed that the frequent use of the island’s waters by its
fishermen generated a claim of sovereignty. The Court, however,
ruled that only government action can generate a sovereign claim, so
the fishermen themselves were insufficient.34

III. Proposed Standard
From these examples, the following rules may be derived. Both
the Roman law of usucapio and the international legal standard for
occupation require “a real element of ‘corpus occupandi’ (taking
possession) as well as an element of ‘animus occupandi’ (the will
to occupy).”35 These are the first two conditions for acquisitive prescription.
(i) Corpus Occupandi
What qualifies as corpus occupandi? From the Pulau Ligitan
and Pulau Sipidan case it is evident that the actions of private per33

Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13).

34

Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 270 (Dec.
17).

35

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 99.
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sons does not constitute corpus occupandi. Rather, the government
of a state must explicitly cause its will to be obeyed in the territory.
So regulation of citizens or activities, the taxing thereof, etc., count
as corpus occupandi. In situations where the territory is uninhabited, however, the terms become much less clear.
In the Eastern Greenland case, Denmark never physically occupied the territory.36 The Island of Palmas arbitration, on the other
hand, emphasizes that without an actual exercise of sovereign authority, any claim on territory is inchoate.37 Denmark’s exercise of
authority in Eastern Greenland included granting monopoly rights
to hunting groups. Thus the Danish Crown exercised its authority in
Eastern Greenland even if they lacked a physical occupation. Therefore, I propose that a positive requirement of corpus occupandi be
maintained. In uninhabited territory, the state need not occupy it
physically, it merely needs to effectively regulate activities.
(ii) Animus Occupandi
Animus occupandi, the will to occupy, means that the possession
of territory by a state must be exercised as a sovereign.38 This means
that if one country occupies a territory with permission from the territory’s owner, that possession cannot generate a prescriptive claim.
Furthermore, acquisitive prescription in international law requires
publicity. If a state discovers a territory but fails to communicate
that discovery, then any other state with a prior claim cannot have
36

Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 Brit.
Y.B. Int’l L. 376, 416 (1950) (“The borderline between attenuated
conditions of effectiveness of occupation and the total relinquishment
of the requirement of effectiveness has become shadowy to the point of
obliteration.”).

37

Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 846 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928) (“An ‘inchoate’ title, such a title exists, it is true, without external
manifestation. However, according to the view that has prevailed at
any rate since the 19th century, an inchoate title of discovery must be
completed within a reasonable period by the effective occupation of the
region claimed to be discovered.”).

38

Johnson, supra note 19, at 344.
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acquiesced.39 Put another way, the owner of a territory cannot acquiesce to another state’s occupation unless they know about it, or could
reasonably be expected to. Therefore, the requirement of animus occupandi is not fulfilled unless the acquiring state both occupies the
territory as a sovereign, and has taken reasonable measures to publicize its occupation.
(iii) “Continuous and Peaceful”
Additionally, a state’s exercise of authority must be both continuous and peaceful. The Island of Palmas arbitration repeatedly emphasized the “continuous and peaceful display of State authority” on
the part of the Netherlands, which superseded the United States’ inchoate title.40 Both the continuous element and the peaceful element
are required: the arbitration specifically points out the need for continuous authority,41 while the arbitration award from the Chamizal
case denied the United States’ claim of prescription because there
was evidence that the American authority was maintained by threat
of force.42 Any authority based on force or which is only intermittent
cannot support a prescriptive claim.
(iv) Acquiescence
The final and most controversial element of acquisitive prescription is acquiescence. For a title to transfer by prescription, the state
that claims a prior title must either explicitly or implicitly acquiesce
to the other state’s occupation. An explicit acquiescence, a formal
recognition of the acquiring state’s authority, would be sufficient to
demonstrate acquiescence. However, the vast majority of acquisitive
prescription cases deal with implicit acquiescence. The precedent
39

Id. at 347.

40

Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 868 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).

41

Id. at 867.

42

Chamizal (Mex. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 329 (Int’l Boundary Comm’n
1911).
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agrees that implicit acquiescence includes two elements: lack of protest and time.
Lack of Protest
Acquisitive prescription requires that the acquiring state has
made its occupation public enough that the original owner of the
territory could reasonably be expected to be aware of it. On the other
hand, there is no positive requirement for the acquiescing state when
the acquiescence is implicit. Rather, it is required to show that the
acquiescing state did not take any action that contested the acquiring
state’s authority. This is a generally agreed upon principle,43 but the
question remaining is which methods of protest suffice and which
do not.
In the modern era, registering protest with the relevant international body—the League of Nations since 1919 or the United Nations
since 1945—is an easily identifiable method. But previous to the formation of said bodies, the acceptable protests would take different
forms. In the Chamizal case, the arbitrators recognized diplomatic
correspondence protesting the situation as sufficient protest.44 What
is not clear is what alternative diplomatic action would also suffice.
If a country published its protest domestically or in correspondence
with some third nation, would that suffice? The precedent is simply
unclear on this.
Therefore, I propose the following standard: Since the acquiring
state must evidence the publicity of its occupation, it seems reasonable to require that the acquiescing state must demonstrate that it
protested either to the acquiring state itself or to the international
community at large. Such protest must be public enough that the
acquiring state could reasonably be expected to be aware of it. Mentioning protest in correspondence with third party nations—unless
they were public negotiations of which the acquiring state could
reasonably be expected to be aware—would not constitute protest,
nor would any form of domestically-published opinion. Exceptions
43

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 105.

44

Chamizal (Mex. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 329 (Int’l Boundary Comm’n
1911).
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might apply if the acquiescing state was somehow unable to publish
such protest due to extreme economic squalor or technological or
natural barriers that the state could not reasonably have been expected to overcome.
Time
The most controversial question is how much time following the
beginning of the occupation indicates implicit acquiescence. Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that this must vary according to the
nature of the territory involved45; uninhabited or remote regions
should require a different length of time than inhabited, accessible
regions. The Island of Palmas arbitration accepted the over-200-year
occupation of the Netherlands, but the Temple of Preah Vihear case
ruled that Thailand had acquiesced to the boundary with Cambodia
after just over 50 years.46 In the original treaty of agreement to the
arbitration of the Guayana Esequiba case, the two nations agreed
that territories possessed longer than 50 years would remain the territory of the acquiring state.47 Thus 50 years is a measuring stick that
multiple cases have used as a standard, at least for inhabited areas.
For uninhabited territories, the general consensus holds that the
more valuable the territory, the longer the temporal threshold for acquiescence.48 Thus, uninhabited islands of little material or strategic
value would require less than more valuable, inhabited areas. If 50
years emerges as the standard of acquiescence for inhabited areas,
then some shorter amount of time would suffice for uninhabited areas. I propose that 40 years is a sufficient length of time to establish
the implicit acquiescence of territorial rights to uninhabited, lowvalue territories.
45

Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, 26 Am. J.
Int’l L. 390, 390 (1932).

46

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 8 (June 15).

47

British Guiana v. United States of Venezuela, 28 R.I.A.A. 331, 335 (Trib.
of Arb. 1899).

48

Johnson, supra note 19, at 347 (quoting Paul Fauchille, 1 Traité De
Droit International Public 762 (8th ed. 1925))
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(v) Condensed Standard
Based on the above analysis, I propose the following general
standard for acquisitive prescription: If the acquiring state provides
evidence of (1) corpus occupandi, (2) public animus occupandi, and
(3) a continuous and peaceful exercise of state authority; and (4) the
acquiescing state fails to provide evidence of sufficiently public protest within 50 years for inhabited or resource-rich areas, or 40 years
for uninhabited and resource-lacking areas (based on how the territory was understood for the majority of the occupation), then the
acquiring state acquires the title, and the acquiescing state’s title is
extinguished via prescription.

IV. Application to Senkaku-Diaoyu Dispute
Japan is quick to assert China’s acquiescence: Since January of
1895 the Senkaku Islands have been under Japanese rule. Their annexation was a separate legal act from the Treaty of Shimonoseki. At
the time, China made no protest whatsoever. Furthermore, in 1945,
which was the 50th anniversary of the annexation, China, which stood
alongside other Allied nations as victors over Japan, made no claim
to the islands.49 More than 20 years later, after the United Nations
Economic Commission for Asia & the Far East discovered potential
oil reserves in the maritime territory near the islands, China raised
its first objection to the status quo, after 71 years of acquiescence.5051
By the proposed standard, China’s 71-year silence constitutes acquiescence.
Furthermore, Japan argues that it has continuously and peacefully exercised authority over the Senkakus since 1895. In 1896,
the Japanese “discoverer” of the islands received from the Japanese
government the exclusive usage rights of the islands. By 1910, 200
people lived on the island, which continued to develop its fishing
industries. In 1932, the discoverer’s son purchased the islands from
49

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 194.

50

Moteki, supra note 4, at 14.

51

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 105.
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the Japanese government and in turn sold it to the Kurihara family
in the 1970s. Nevertheless, during this entire period, property taxes
were consistently paid to the government of Okinawa Prefecture.52
In 2012, the Japanese government successfully nationalized the islands. Japan’s claim of effective occupation is well supported.
The Chinese argue that Japan’s prescriptive claim lacks a publicized animus occupandi. The Japanese decision to annex the islands
was not made by the government publicly, but rather in a closed
meeting of cabinet ministers.53 Furthermore, the year following the
annexation, the imperial edict updating the Okinawa Prefecture registry did not contain the islands.54 In contrast, when Japan annexed
the Ogasawara Islands in 1876 and again in 1891, it published their
intent, stating the islands’ names and locations publicly.55 Not only
did Japan not declare any intent of acquisition to the international
community, it also failed to publicly announce or record the islands’
annexation domestically.
Further, the Chinese claim that they never acquiesced. In 1941,
due to the difficulties of the Second World War, the Japanese government ceased supply shipments to the islands, forcing all the islands’
inhabitants to return to Okinawa Prefecture.56 The islands were
again uninhabited and unmaintained until the end of the war in 1945.
After Japan’s defeat, the islands fell into the United States’ custody.
Therefore, the Japanese occupation of the Senkakus ended in 1941.
To the Chinese, then, the Japanese occupation did not last 71 years,
but rather 46. Since the islands had been inhabited and productive
during the occupation, China would argue that the 50-year requirement should apply. If that is the case, then the Japanese occupation
did not last long enough for the Chinese to acquiesce.
52

Moteki, supra note 4, at 7–14.

53

Diaoyudao shi Zhongguo de Guyou Lingtu, supra note 12.

54

Lohmeyer, supra note 2, at 159.

55

Han-yi Shaw, [The Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands Dispute; its History and
an analysis of the ownership claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., And Japan]
104 (Sch. Of Law Univ. of Md. 3rd ed. 1999).

56

Moteki, supra note 4, at 9.
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Neither of the above arguments is persuasive. While the Japanese demonstrate corpus occupandi and unopposed occupation,
they also failed to publicize their occupation. But the Chinese should
not be quick to rejoice; they never landed on nor displayed authority
over the inhabitants of the Senkakus, so if their original claim to the
islands is held to the proposed requirements for corpus occupandi,
then their title is also inchoate. What this means is that both countries have defective claims.

V. Conclusion
This is actually a desirable outcome; without dismissing either
side entirely, the International Court of Justice can offer this analysis
as an advisory opinion, pushing the issue out of the legal realm and
into the diplomatic. Since both sides have registered their protest,
no further demonstrations of authority would have any legal impact.
With that, the legal motivation to flex military authority is removed,
and diplomacy becomes the most efficient way to approach the Senkakus.
The Senkaku Islands dispute is a legal Gordian knot. Unfortunately, a dearth of applicable precedent and the internal political
realities of both countries leave the Alexandrian solution nowhere
to be found. Currently, the vagueness of acquisitive prescription encourages aggressive assertions of sovereignty. My proposed standard
clarifies acquisitive prescription and discourages military responses.
In the absence of legal leverage, the most viable remaining option
would be increased diplomatic interaction; the contested rights to
the islands would become a bargaining chip instead of a powder keg.

